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OPTING OUT OR COPPING OUT? AN
ARGUMENT FOR STRICT SCRUTINY OF

INDIVIDUAL CONTRACTS
Charles L. Knapp*
Recently I attended the Fiftieth Anniversary Reunion of my
college class, Denison University 1956. After a busy weekend, I
came away with new memories and renewed friendships, and was
greatly impressed with the energy and vitality of my classmates.
Many, perhaps most of my cohorts appear to be settling intoperhaps more accurately, plunging into-a host of new activities,
freed by retirement from continued immersion in whatever career
they pursued for most of their adult lives. At least so far, however, I,
like many teaching colleagues past and present, have chosen to keep
at the teaching/writing game well past a respectable retirement age.
The invitation to take part in this symposium provides an opportunity
for me to share my reflections on the state of contract law from the
vantage point of some forty-plus years in the classroom.
Along with my Depression-Baby classmates, I find myself in the
somewhat bittersweet position of having survived not only many of
my contemporaries, but even my century. We were born early
enough to remember World War II, but late enough to avoid having
to fight it. Not Tom Brokaw's "Greatest Generation," we were in
some ways the Luckiest Generation. Raised during the war and postwar period; young adults in the prosperous (for most of us)
"Eisenhower years"; early acolytes, many of us, at the Kennedy
shrine. We have seen war, famine, pestilence and death, but, for the
most part, at a comfortable remove. Having witnessed decades of
violent, even revolutionary change (and often counter-change) in the
political and social arena, we now find ourselves also surrounded by
technological advances well beyond what most of us could have
* Joseph W. Cotchett Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California
Hastings
College of the Law.
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imagined in our college years. Besides "Twentieth Century Fox,"
that puzzlingly persistent corporate logo, what else remains of our
Twentieth Century? In my case, and in this context, the question is a
more focused one: What remains of Twentieth Century contract law?
Does that particular institution make it into Century 21? Or does it
fail to make the cut, along with the Nehru jacket, the eight-track tape,
and the Oldsmobile?
Obituaries for Contract Law are nothing new; they 2have been3
to Scott,
coming for some time now. From Macaulay' to Gilmore
the details differ, but the thrust remains the same: contract law as
imagined by Langdell, Williston and Corbin is, if not dead, at least
irrelevant to those for whom it purportedly exists, along with Article
2, the crown jewel of Llewellyn's Uniform Commercial Code. 4 Of
course, there have also been denials.5 But even Mark Twain, reports
of whose death indeed had been greatly exaggerated, eventually gave
up the ghost, and garnered some accurate obituaries. Are we
reaching that point with the contract law system?
A few years ago, I sounded a brief warning about what I
perceived as a potential threat to our common law of contract, posed
by what I and many others have referred to as "mandatory
arbitration"-the judicial enforcement of pre-dispute contractual
arbitration clauses, particularly in situations where the clause was
imposed by one party and assented to only weakly, if at all, by the
other.6 The threat I wrote about then appears no less real today.
What I propose to do here, however, is to take a somewhat wider
perspective and consider a collection of other developments that
have the real potential of finally finishing off modern contract law, at
least the Twentieth Century variety. Some of these are as new as the
Ipod, but some are older than the Victrola. Taken together, they
1. Stewart Macaulay, Non-ContractualRelations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM.
Soc. REV. 55 (1963).
2. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974).
3. Robert E. Scott, The Death of ContractLaw, 4 U. TORONTO L.J. 369 (2004).
4. Robert E. Scott, The Rise and Fall of Article 2, 62 LA. L. REV. 1009 (2002); see also
Gregory E. Maggs, Karl Llewellyn 's Fading Imprint on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 541 (2000).
5. E.g., Richard E. Speidel, Afterword: The Shifting Domain of Contract, 90 Nw. U. L.
REV. 254 (1995) (the concluding piece in a symposium devoted to reconsideration of Gilmore's
Death of Contract,supra note 2).
6. Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in Contract Law, 71
FoRDHAM L. REV. 761 (2002) [hereinafter Knapp, Taking Contracts Private].
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present the grim prospect of a new Medieval era of contract-a legal
regime in which the institution of contract becomes not a liberating
force, but an enslaving one.
In the discussion that follows, after some preliminary
observations, I will offer my own broad-brush view of the
development of American contract law, first over the Twentieth
Century generally, and then with an eye to developments around the
turn of the Twenty-First Century. At each point, I will consider
specifically the ways in which the power of form-contract drafters
has grown, both in their ability to impose their forms on other
contracting parties, and in the substantive devices available to them.
In the course of those discussions I will offer some reasons why the
contract law system might appropriately differentiate between
business organizations and individuals, in approaching the resolution
of disputes. I will then attempt to make a case for greater judicial
scrutiny than today is customarily brought to bear on mass contracts,
especially those between business organizations-(principally
corporations) on the one hand, and individuals (consumers or
workers)-on the other. It is my thesis that courts have not only the
opportunity, but also the obligation, to bring their power to bear in
situations where individual parties are otherwise virtually (no pun
intended, this time) powerless in the contract marketplace.
I. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

In order to talk about the operation of contract law, we should
probably begin by defining our subject matter. By contract law, I
mean simply that body of mostly common law rules, which, in the
Anglo-American legal system, governs the potential enforcement of
the voluntarily expressed promise (or "commitment"). This promise
is either exchanged, as part of an agreement to exchange
performances, or relied on in a foreseeable and substantial manner by
the person to whom the promise was made. 7 This working definition
is narrower than some other definitions that one might imagine. 8 It
does not speak to the question of why such a legal regime should
exist and what purposes it should serve, but it does identify the

7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 1, 2, 17, 90 (1981).
8. E.g., IAN MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS (1980).

INQUIRY INTO MODERN
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voluntary expression of commitment as the linchpin of contractual
enforcement.
A related issue is the nature of the actors capable of making and
enforcing these commitments. Clearly they might be individualsflesh and blood human beings. But in our legal system they may also
be "persons" who are not individuals but legal constructs-abstract
entities created for various reasons (usually to engage in commercial
activity, but for other reasons as well), such as corporations,
partnerships, and the like. These entities have the capacity to incur
and to enforce legal obligations, particularly contractual ones. They
necessarily act through human agents, but have an independent legal
existence apart from the agents they employ. Although the rules of
classical contract law were traditionally articulated and applied
without any overt regard to the nature of the actors, 9 courts and
writers have become used to differentiating, at least between
"merchants"' 10 (professional sellers of goods in the Article 2 sense
and also other large commercial enterprises) and those whom we
ordinarily refer to as "consumers."1 1 Less well-established, but
equally useful, it seems to me, is a more refined, tripartite
categorization: individuals (flesh and blood people), small businesses
(sometimes individual proprietorships and sometimes closely held
corporations), and large corporate entities.
Individuals, as
distinguished from the other two categories, are sellers in any
substantial sense only of their own labor, and in that role we might
refer to them as "workers."
Otherwise they are typically
"consumers"-buyers of goods and services for personal, family or
household use. 12 Of course, business enterprises large and small are
buyers as well as sellers, and they buy not only for resale but also as
consumers in the "end-user" sense. Still, the three categories can be
useful not only to differentiate the types of activities engaged in by

9. The Restatement's rules often do not distinguish between individuals and business
entities; its illustrations typically characterize the parties only as A, B, etc. See, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 illus. 15.
10. See U.C.C. § 2-104(1) (2003).
11. See Id. § 2-103(l)(c) (defining "consumer" as one who buys goods that are intended to
be used for "personal, family or household purposes"); § 9-102(a)(23) (defining "consumer
goods"). Under the UCC scheme, a business entity can be a "buyer in ordinary course," id. § 1201(b)(9), but not a "consumer" under either Article 2 or 9. See generally U.C.C. arts. 2, 9.
12. This usage is slightly broader than the UCC's, which refers to buyers of goods. See
U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(a).
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various actors, but also to describe the degrees of market power.
Large business enterprises generally have the most power; ordinary
individuals have the least; small businesses fall somewhere in
between, depending on the degree to which they
resemble either
1 3
organizations.
corporate
or
individual enterprises
Writers, recent and not so recent, have argued that business
enterprises generally prefer to make their own rules. To the extent
they are able to do so, they either ignore the legal regime governing
their contractual relations, or opt out of that regime into some other
14
body of law they regard as preferable for a variety of reasons.
Maybe so. And if so, then "contract law," to that extent, can be
considered, if not exactly "dead," at least as being irrelevant to the
way that our society does business. But there is a threshold issue
here: Since neither individuals nor corporations can unilaterally
declare themselves free of the constraints of the legal system, "opting
out" essentially means making agreements to do so-agreements
between contracting partners that, as between them, their transaction
will be subject to some other set of rules, or some other set of legal
institutions. But since such an opt-out agreement is itself a contract,
it must necessarily be subject initially to regulation by the regime it
seeks to displace, if only to know whether and to what extent that
opting-out agreement will be enforced in the event that one of the
parties later attempts to avoid its effects.
If two large-scale
enterprises with the desire and the resources to engage in planning
mutually agree to opt out of some aspect of a legal regime when
dealing with each other, there is no obvious reason of public policy
why that choice should be second-guessed, unless it has external
negative effects. However, when one such large-scale enterprise
adopts the practice of insisting on imposing opt-out agreements on
others-small businesses or individuals (workers or consumers)-as
the price of doing business at all, then the contract law system has a
legitimate claim to play an oversight role.

13. See generally Larry T. Garvin, Small Business and the False Dichotomies of Contract
Law, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 295 (2005); Blake D. Morant, The Questfor Bargains in an Age
of ContractualFormalism: Strategic Initiativesfor Small Businesses, 7 J. SMALL & EMERGING
Bus. L. 233 (2003).
14. See, e.g., Macaulay, supra note 1, at 60; Scott, supra note 3, at 377-80; Lisa Bernstein,
Opting Out of the Legal System: ExtralegalContractualRelations in the DiamondIndustry, 21 J.
LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992).
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II. TWENTIETH CENTURY CONTRACT LAW

In a brief contribution to another contracts symposium, I
recently suggested that it might be useful to employ the label
"Modem Contract Law" to refer specifically to contract law as it
developed over the course of the mid-Twentieth Century (before
Law-and-Economics, the New Conceptualism/Formalism and
various other post-modem developments) rather than as meaning
simply "whatever is current at the moment"-particularly since it is
not clear whether "at the moment" there is indeed a There there in
terms of a present-day consensus.1 5 But even though "Modem
Contract Law," in the narrower sense, represents a significant shift
away from the earlier classical vision of Professor Williston and his
contemporaries,' 6 it retains or even elaborates many aspects of the
classical system, which together have serious implications for the
law's handling of agreements that result from the application of
unequal bargaining power. These would include the following:
dominance of the document, dominance of the drafter, and
ascendance of the firm.
A. Dominance of the Document
As every first-year law student soon discovers, it is not true that
an agreement must be in writing to be enforceable. Many types of
common agreements are not subject to any statute of frauds at all.
Even those that are might still be enforced in the absence of a
writing, at least to a limited extent, where restitutionary or reliance
principles make that appropriate. 17 But any agreement of any
significance, particularly where at least one of the parties is a
substantial commercial enterprise, is almost certain to be
memorialized in some sort of "record" ("written" or otherwise)
anyway.' 8 Of much more practical importance are the legal rules
that make it harder to establish and enforce any terms of agreement
that are not included in the writing when a written agreement does
exist.
Application of the parol evidence rule-applying to
agreements prior to or contemporaneous with the creation of the
15. Charles L. Knapp, An Offer You Can't Revoke, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 309, 316-17.
16. See generally id. at 316-19.
17. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, §§ 110, 129, 139, 375 (1981).
18. See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(b)(31), (43) (2003) (defining "record" and "writing").
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writing 9-and inclusion in the written agreement of a "no-oralmodifications" clause-applying to agreements made afterwards 2 0together will make it impossible, in many cases, for the proponent of
an express term not contained in the writing to present evidence of its
existence.2 1 Modem Contract Law in theory loosened up contract
law's approach to interpretation and the parol evidence rule, making
the latter somewhat easier to circumvent. 22 But despite the clear
antipathy of many writers and judges over the years, that rule2 3 has
persisted, and, if anything, has regained strength in recent years.
Dominance of the document in this sense is not necessarily
problematic in terms of the parties' intentions; indeed, it may be
what both parties want, at least at the point when their written
agreement is created, because each hopes to avoid costly arguments
later about the terms of their agreement. But that assumes that two
parties, each with substantial bargaining power, are actively
negotiating terms.
When the agreement is embodied in a
standardized form, created by one party and acceded to by the other,
different considerations come into play. If one party controls the
drafting and presents the other party with a form contract, nearly all
of which is boilerplate and offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, the
resulting product may be what we have come to call a contract of
24
adhesion.
The and
"adhering"
party
notthe
required,
or even
expected,
to read the form,
may well
not is
have
resources
(in time
and in

19. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 209-217 (1981); U.C.C. § 2202.
20. U.C.C. § 2-209(2).
21. See Charles L. Knapp, Rescuing Reliance: The Perils of Promissory Estoppel, 49
HASTINGS L.J. 1191, 1303-07 (1998) (discussing the interaction of the parol evidence rule and
the "no-oral-modification" clause device).
22. See generally JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS, §§ 3.93.17 (5th ed. 2003).
23. Jay M. Feinman, Un-Making Law: The Classical Revival in the Common Law, 28
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 14-29 (2004); Ralph James Mooney, The New Conceptualism in Contract
Law, 74 OR. L. REV. 1131, 1170-72 (1995).
24. See generally Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1173 (1983) (the essential modern article on this subject). Professor Rakoff
defines "contract of adhesion" as a printed form that purports to be a contract, drafted by one
party and presented to the other on the explicit understanding that few terms will be open to
negotiation, and adhered to by the other after dickering over whatever terms are open to
bargaining. Id. at 1177. Additionally, the drafter enters into many such contracts and the
adherent into comparatively few. Id. Rakoff does not limit his definition to cases where the
adhering party is an individual, but he does confine it to transactions in which the adhering
party's principal obligation is the payment of money, thus excluding employment contracts. Id.
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expertise) fully to analyze and evaluate it anyway. Indeed, the
contracting agent of the drafting party may well have no authority to
vary the terms of the form in any event. And yet the adhering party
is presumptively bound by whatever terms that agreement contains,
by the "duty to read" principle. 2 5 Added to the other rules noted
above, the duty to read produces a situation in which one party to an
agreement has bound herself to a writing she has not read or
understood in full, but to which she is legally and completely bound.
Everything in the document is binding on her, and nothing that's not
in the document can ameliorate that.
B. Dominance of the Drafter
I have described this state of affairs as one of dominance of the
document, but of course what it really is, is dominance of the drafter.
In some cases, the adhering party may have a defense to the legal
effectiveness of the written agreement on some ground such as
duress or fraud.
These will be aberrational cases, however.
Bargaining on a take-it-or-leave-it basis could be the starting point of
a successful defense of duress, but the ordinary business deal-even
where one party accedes to a bargain on terms it otherwise would
resist because business necessity leaves it no acceptable alternativewill not rise (or fall) to that level.26 Similarly, fraud "in the
factum, '' 7 or in some cases even "in the inducement," 28 may be
grounds for avoiding a contract. Evidence of such fraud may even
get past the procedural barrier of the parol evidence rule. But unless
the drafting party has actively misrepresented the contents of the
form, this too is likely to provide no basis for avoidance. 29 So the
adhering party in the ordinary case is stuck with whatever terms the
written agreement may contain, plus any legal default rules that
apply in the circumstances. Is that a problem?
25. See, e.g., Ray v. William G. Eurice & Bros., Inc., 93 A.2d 272, 278 (Md. 1952) ("One
who.., manifests acceptance of the terms of a writing which he should reasonably understand to
be an offer or proposed contract, is bound by the contract, though ignorant of the terms of the
writing or of its proper interpretation." (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 70
(1932))). The Second Restatement has a somewhat watered-down version that attempts to give
the court some leeway where standardized forms are concerned. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1981); see generally PERILLO, supra note 22, §§ 9.41-9.45.
26. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 175-176.
27. Id. §§ 162-163.
28. Id. §§ 164, 167.
29. And maybe not even then. See id. § 166 cmt. a.
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Maybe not. Maybe everything will go well, each party will
perform as the other hoped and expected, and both of them (and the
rest of us, too, probably) will be better off as a result. Agreements
facilitate exchange, and commercial exchanges in the long run
should benefit not only the immediate parties but society in general.
But if a dispute does develop, it may be crucial to know if any terms
of the writing are potentially unenforceable, or if any term of
agreement not in the writing may nevertheless be part of the package
of enforceable rights and duties. For instance, the writing may, in
some respects, define the performance obligations of either party in
ways that the adhering party did not anticipate. The writing may
contain unexpected exceptions to the duty to perform, or disclaimers
of warranties of quality that the law would otherwise imply. It may
limit or exclude the drafting party's liability for consequential or
other types of damages that would otherwise be available as a matter
of law, or put a monetary cap on the adhering party's potential
damage recovery. On the other hand, it may impose on the adhering
party the obligation of paying liquidated damages greater than those
that the law would otherwise assess in the event of her breach. Does
the adhering party have any recourse against the enforcement of such
terms?
In addition to the possible defenses already noted, there are
some legal doctrines that the adhering party may invoke to temper
the effect of the document as drafted. Depending on the skill of the
drafter (some documents are more ironclad than others), the adhering
party may be able to persuade a sympathetic judge that the document
has at least some ambiguity (perhaps patent, perhaps latent) that
30
justifies its interpretation in a way more favorable to the adherent.
Invoking a legal maxim that imposes on the drafter the risk of
ambiguity in the writing, the adhering party may thereby get past the
parol evidence rule to present evidence that the writing does not
mean what at first blush it may have appeared to mean. 3 1 And, at
least where contracts of insurance are involved and possibly with
respect to other contracts of adhesion, the adhering party may
persuade the court that a particular term in the writing, if interpreted
as the drafter desires, would so substantially fail to meet the adhering

30. See PERILLO, supra note 22, §§ 3.10, 3.13.
31.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206.

104
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party's reasonable expectations that it should not be enforced.32
If all else fails, the adhering party can fall back on the defense of
unconscionability. Ancient in its origins but resuscitated as part of
Karl Llewellyn's version of Modem Contract Law, this doctrine was
incorporated in Article 2 of the U.C.C. 33 and later in the Restatement

(Second) of Contracts 34 with the expressed aim of giving the courts
permission to do overtly what they would otherwise often strive to
do covertly-avoid the enforcement of contracts or terms which
were so egregiously one-sided as to be shocking to the conscience of
the court. This is especially true in situations where the imposition
of such terms seems to be the result of more than the ordinary
imbalance of bargaining power to be expected in a free-market
economy. 35 This principle has been often invoked, with varying
degrees of success, usually in consumer/merchant transactions,3 6 but
occasionally is used in situations where both parties are commercial
enterprises. 37 For a period of time in the Twentieth Century it
appeared to play an important role in tandem with state and federal
legislatures, in reining in some of the most exploitative practices
affecting consumers. 38 In more recent years, however, it has been
relatively little used, although, as we shall see, that may be changing.
C. Ascendance of the Firm

Although not ordinarily thought of as aspects of contract law,
there are other features of the legal environment that have an
important impact on the way that contracts come into being, and on
their legal effects. These developed in different ways and for
different reasons, but together they have the effect of increasing
substantially the disadvantages that individuals face in the
32. E.g., C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975); see
generally CHARLES L. KNAPP, NATHAN M. CRYSTAL & HARRY G. PRINCE, PROBLEMS IN

CONTRACT LAW 376-81 (Aspen 5th ed. 2003) [hereinafter KNAPP, KCP].
33. U.C.C. § 2-302 (2003).
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208.
35. Karl N. Llewellyn, Book Reviews, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700, 702-05 (1939).
36. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (the leading
case); see also Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionabilityand the Code-The Emperor's New Clause,
115 U. PA. L. REv. 485 (1967) (the leading article). For a recent commentary on the WalkerThomas case, see Russell Korobkin's A "Traditional" and "Behavioral" Law-and-Economics
Analysis of Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Company, 26 U. HAW. L. REV. 441 (2004).
37. See generally KNAPP, KCP, supra note 32, at 595-98.
38. See generally id. at 576-78.
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contracting arena
Well before the dawn of the Twentieth Century, the law of
agency enabled individuals to employ others to act for them in the
conduct of transactions. Empowered with authority conferred by
their principals, agents could buy, sell, and enter into contracts for
the buying and selling of all kinds of goods and services, binding
their principals in the process. 39 Thus, one dealing with the agent of
another could ordinarily expect that the promises and representations
made by the agent would be binding on the principal, committing
On the other hand, one
him to enforceable legal obligations.
dealing with the agent of another would run the risk that
representations and promises made by the agent-particularly if not
incorporated in whatever written agreement resulted from their
dealings-would not be honored by the principal, nor enforced by
the law.41 So even at this level, the notion of a contract as a personal
exchange of commitments between individuals has been attenuated
by the presence of intermediaries-actors who are understood to be
speaking for someone else who is not directly engaged in the
agreement-making process.
This process of attenuation has also been furthered by the
development over time of the twin concepts of assignment and
delegation. Although originally requiring the personal participation
of those who undertake contractual obligations, the law, in most
cases, came to accept the proposition that the duties imposed by a
contract could be enforced by persons to whom the right to receive
performance had been assigned, and conversely, that performance by
persons to whom the actual rendering of performance had been
Granted, some
delegated would be regarded as sufficient.42
contractual duties continue to be regarded as so inherently personal
that their performance may not effectively be delegated to others,43
or perhaps even demanded by others,4 4 but by and large the weight of
the law-both common law and statute-had by the mid-Twentieth
Century swung behind the proposition that most ordinary contracts
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 144 (1958).
Id. §§ 145, 146.
See id. §§ 256-260.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 15, introductory note.
See id. § 318(2); U.C.C. § 2-210(1).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 317(2); U.C.C. § 2-210(2).
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were assignable as a matter of law-certainly if the initial agreement
did not provide otherwise, and quite possibly even if it did.45
The preceding observations apply to contractual transactions
between individuals, of course-individual contracting parties can
and do act through agents, and they can and do assign and delegate
the rights and duties created by their contracts. But now add to the
mix another legal innovation: the limited-liability corporation. This
device is by far the most important of the "legal persons" we spoke
of earlier (the non-flesh-and-blood actors in the legal realm). The
concept of a limited-liability corporation is hardly novel; such
enterprises were major forces before the dawn of the Twentieth
Century, and they are not going away any time soon. 4 6 Simultaneously superhuman and subhuman-like computers, in that
regard-corporations bestride our society like so many colossi. Our
modem economic order has grown from and depends on their
presence, and the law welcomes and accommodates them. But the
presence of the corporation as a legal actor continues the process of
depersonalizing contractual relations in a host of ways, and to an
incalculable degree.
To begin with, the impersonality of the corporation carries to a
logical conclusion the depersonalization process that began with the
recognition of a principal's ability to deal through agents. Assume
that you are-as in real life you have been, countless times, and will
be again-the adhering party to a standard-form contract. Not only
is the individual with whom you originally dealt in all probability not
the one whom you expect to render the promised performance, there
may in fact be no individual obligated to perform at all. Individual
agents report to other individuals, and so-on up the line of authority.
But at the end of that line may be only a corporation-an abstract
entity, dedicated solely to the maximization of profit for its
shareholders. To the extent that you did deal with an individual
agent, can you expect that this individual's promises and representations to you will be honored by his principal? The duty to
read and the parol evidence rule, together with the rules of agency
law, make it likely that a corporate principal with impunity can, and
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 322; U.C.C. §§ 2-210(2)-(4), 9-406(d), (f),
9-408.
46. See generally JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, CORPORATIONS 1-9, 31-44
(Aspen 2d. ed. 2003).
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in many cases will, deny that any promises beyond those expressed
in the writing were made at all, or that even if made are binding on it.
Agents can be and are replaced by other agents, so the one you dealt
with in making your agreement may be long gone by the time a
dispute arises, and in his place you may find someone who neither
knows nor cares what unwritten assurances you might have received
earlier. 47 And ultimately, the rights and duties created by your
original contract may be assigned and delegated to another entityanother corporate entity, of course-with which you have not dealt,
about which you may know nothing at all, and from which you can
expect recognition of your rights only to the extent expressly
provided in your written agreement. Even though the original
contracting party ordinarily remains liable for the performance of
duties that it has delegated to another,4 8 as a practical matter your
ability to pursue it is likely to be sharply limited once your contract
has been assigned.4 9
Besides accommodating them in many ways in the formation
process, the substantive law of contracts tends to protect and reward
commercial entities more fully than individuals, both in what the law
aspires to do, and in what it does not. To protect the expectation
interest of the aggrieved plaintiff, contract law ordinarily attempts, if
feasible, to award as damages the economic gain that would have
been realized by performance on both sides. 50 In the case of a
business enterprise, this may be lost profit-the profit that the
plaintiff expected to make on this transaction, or in some cases from
another transaction which has now been prevented by this
defendant's breach. 51 Economic injury, whether quantifiable or not,
is of course ultimately the only injury that a business corporation can
47. E.g., Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1981)
(upholding jury verdict against Shell Oil where a change in management at Shell Oil's mainland
headquarters led to Shell's repudiation of a long-standing practice of "price protection" in selling
asphalt to the plaintiff paving company).
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 318(3); U.C.C. § 2-210(1).
49. Before a right is assigned, the obligor may enjoy the right of setoff for claims it has
against the assignor. Once assignment has taken place, however, that right may be limited. See
U.C.C. §§ 2-717, 9-404. The obligor may thus find itself fighting a two-front war against the
assignee and the assignor (defending against the former; attempting to assert rights against the
latter). And if the assignor has essentially gone out of business, even a valid claim against it may
have little real value.
50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 344(a), 347.
51. E.g., Florafax Int'l, Inc. v. GTE Mkt. Res., Inc., 933 P.2d 282, 292 (Okla. 1997).
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sustain. On the other hand, individual consumers do not enter into
contracts to make a profit; they do so to obtain necessary or desirable
goods and services. The kinds of economic losses suffered by
individual consumers fall more in the realm of injury to person or
property, or perhaps incidental damages in the form of money spent
on mitigation. 52 But individuals also can and do sustain other kinds
of injury that are not quantifiable nor even economic in nature:
emotional distress, pain, and suffering. Sometimes these latter types
of injury are the result of tortious conduct, in which case they may be
comprehended and remedied by the law of torts. To the extent,
however, that such injuries flow from conduct which is in breach of a
contract, they may go uncompensated, even if the defendant's
conduct would also qualify as a tort.53 Emotional distress, pain, and
suffering: these are harms that an individual can suffer, but not a
business corporation. I suggested earlier that the corporation, like
the computer, is both superhuman and subhuman, and here is one
example of the latter point: Like the Tin Man, a corporation has no
heart, and no feelings either. (To be sure, a corporation may suffer a
compensable reputational injury, but only because ultimately such an
injury may lower its profits, not because its feelings were hurt.) And
since a corporation cannot feel non-monetary pain, it is perhaps not
surprising that, with few and grudging exceptions, the law of
contracts does not deem such pain of individual plaintiffs worthy of
compensation.54
There is still another advantage the corporate enterprise enjoys
over the individual (consumer or worker) in the realm of contract
remedies. All plaintiffs seeking compensation for breach of contract
are subject to the general principle of avoidable consequences, often
referred to as the duty to mitigate.55 Yet this burden falls differently
on individuals than on business corporations. The individual worker
has only her own labor to sell. If she is wrongfully discharged from
a fixed-term employment, her recovery of lost salary will be reduced
52. The Second Restatement describes these as consequential or incidental damages.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 cmt. c.

53. Id. § 353.
54. E.g., Erlich v. Menezes, 981 P.2d 978 (Cal. 1999) (no recovery for emotional distress for
homeowners whose house was constructed in almost unbelievably incompetent fashion;
plaintiffs' actual harm apparently grossly undercompensated by damages allowed). See generally
KNAPP, KCP, supra note 32, at 882-84.
55.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350.
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to the extent that she either does or reasonably might have obtained
56
comparable gainful employment during the remainder of the term.
A corporation, on the other hand, is presumed to be capable of
rendering an infinite number of performances at one time, or, at the
least, one more in addition to the one called for by its contract with
the breaching defendant. The mere existence of a potentially
profitable other opportunity thus will not serve to mitigate the
corporate plaintiff's recovery of lost profits unless the defendant can
show that the plaintiff's performance of both contracts was
impossible or at best highly unlikely. 57 Similarly, the "lost volume
seller" of goods or services can often establish its right to recover for
the profit lost on its contract with the defendant buyer, even where
other opportunities for profit were plentiful, and indeed were taken.58
The logic in each case may be impeccable, but the collective effect
of these rules illustrates the superhuman side of the business
corporation-because it can and does employ a multitude of
individuals to do its bidding, it can in theory not only leap a tall
building at a single bound, it can leap any number of them
simultaneously.
III. TURN-OF-THE-CENTURY CONTRACT LAW

For those of us who are accustomed to using the term "Turn-ofthe-Century Contract Law" to refer to the Gay Nineties or the

56. Id. § 350 cmt. c, illus. 8.
57. When the contract in question does not require personal performance, the law will
presume that the party obligated to perform could have acted through agents and performed other
contracts simultaneously.
E.g., Koplin v. Faulkner, 293 S.W.2d 467 (Ky. 1956); see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350 cmt. d, illus. 10. The principle illustrated here is
not limited to corporate plaintiffs, but since most business organizations with significant
economic power are corporations, the point in the text seems to me to be essentially accurate.
Since a sole proprietorship is somewhat more likely than a corporation to be a "one-person
show," it may in practice be a little easier to rebut the presumption of non-mitigation where a
non-corporate business entity is the plaintiff. On the other hand, an individual employee
contracting to render personal service will always be subject to the mitigation principle, at least
where both employments were essentially full-time jobs. Moreover, she will also be subject to
the rule that even a non-"mitigating" opportunity for employment, if accepted, will be treated as
"gain made possible" by the breach, and be an offset against damages. E.g., Marshall Sch. Dist.
v. Hill, 939 S.W.2d 319 (Ark. Ct. App. 1997) (reducing wrongfully discharged teacher's recovery
by income from other jobs, including work in shirt factory). So an employee with little economic
power may have no practical alternative than to take whatever work she can get, even though this
will reduce her potential claim for salary lost through wrongful discharge.
58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350 cmt. d, illus. 9; U.C.C. § 2-708(2) cmt.
5 (2003).
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Edwardian Age, it is a little startling to realize that "turn-of-thecentury" today means the turn of the Twenty-First Century-and
describes a lot of things that are only just now starting to be visible in
our rear view mirror. The preceding description of contract law
seems to me to be reasonably accurate as of circa 1980. But in the
latter years of the Twentieth Century, two developments can be
observed which substantially aggravated the imbalances of
contracting power as they had existed up to that time. The modes of
contract-formation proliferated, and so did the ways in which
drafting parties attempted to take advantage of their bargaining
power.
A Dominance of the Document II
As sales law developed in the Nineteenth Century and into the
Twentieth, courts gradually came around to the notion that the sellerprotective notion of caveat emptor ought to be tempered, to some
extent, by a willingness to imply warranties of quality, at least in the
case of a merchant seller. In addition, courts began holding that the
law should be somewhat less tolerant of the sort of borderline fraud
that often passed as the mere "puffing" of wares. This was codified
first by the Uniform Sales Act and then with more vigor in Article 2
of the U.C.C., which provides for the enforcement of warranties both
express and implied, including warranties of merchantability and of
fitness. 59 Those in the Code were somewhat broader and harder to
disclaim, but in both cases the parties, if they so agreed, could negate
some or all implied warranties, as well as limit the seller's damage
liability. 60 So an important feature of the standard contract form
offered by merchant sellers would likely be one or more provisions
attempting to do just that. Many legal issues were raised by contracts
of this sort. Sometimes the question would be whether the language
of the disclaimer or limitation was sufficient to meet this statutory
requirement; sometimes it was whether disclaimers of warranty and
limitations of liability set forth on the package or the label of the
goods would bind a buyer who did not actually sign any contract

59. U.C.C. §§ 2-313, 2-314, 2-315. The Uniform Sales Act provisions are discussed in
PATRICIA F. FONSECA & JOHN R. FONSECA, 2 WILLISTON ON SALES §§ 15:1-15:37 (5th ed.
2005).
60. U.C.C. § 2-316; FONSECA & FONSECA, supra note 59, §§ 15:27, 15:28.
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expressly agreeing to those terms. 6 1 In cases like these, the language
that the seller wanted to incorporate would at least be available for
the buyer to read, if she chose to do so, before making the decision to
purchase.
But other cases have tested the ability of sellers to control the
content of the contract with terms contained inside the box, terms
which the buyer does not even have a chance to read before the
goods have been delivered to her. Earlier decisions had recognized
that terms more favorable to the buyer in many ways-express
warranties and provisions for remedies, for instance-might be
included along with an "owner's manual," a "warranty registration,"
or some other document packaged with the goods, and that those
terms might be enforceable by the buyer on a theory of implied
modification. 62 Modifications under U.C.C. Article 2 do not require
fresh consideration, so the buyer's assent to a modification favorable
to her might reasonably be implied where such a change in terms was
proposed by the seller.63 More recent cases, however, have
considered whether the seller can add to the contract terms that are
unfavorable to the buyer, or at least terms that she later resists in the
context of a dispute with the seller. Two of the best known of these
cases were both decided by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in
opinions written by Judge Frank Easterbrook. One involved a
"shrinkwrap" license contained in a package of computer software; 64
the other tested the validity of an arbitration clause contained, along
with other printed material, inside a box delivered to the buyer's
home in response to a telephoned order to buy a computer. 65 In both
cases, the court concluded that because the buyers, at least in theory,
had an opportunity to read the contested language and then withdraw
from the contract of purchase, they were bound by the terms of the
seller's form. Courts and writers have taken to using the term
61. E.g., Gold Kist, Inc. v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 333 S.E.2d 67, 71 (S.C. Ct. App.
1985).
62. E.g., Harris v. Ford Motor Co., 845 F. Supp. 1511 (M.D. Ala. 1994) (warranty in glove
compartment of new car); Perfetti v. McGhan Med., 662 P.2d 646 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983)
(statements in package insert). See generally GREGORY M. TRAVALIO, ROBERT J. NORDSTROM
& ALBERT L. CLOVIS, NORDSTROM ON SALES & LEASES OF GOODS § 4.05 [F][2] (2d ed. 2000).
63. See U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 7. See generally JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-5 (5th ed. 2000).
64. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
65. Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
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"rolling contracts" to refer to such a situation where buyers contract
to purchase goods or services knowing (or arguably having "reason
to know") that additional terms would be forthcoming, terms which
the seller would expect to be binding on the buyer unless in some
prescribed fashion she
opted out of the new terms, or perhaps out of
66
entirely.
the contract
Such rolling contracts may push the notion of "assent" in
standardized-form contracting to-or perhaps past-the breaking
point, but the leading cases just described at least involved
transactions conducted with some interaction between individuals.
Other recent cases go even farther in reducing the human element.
Back in the days when mailboxes were real, not virtual, contract law
developed a "mailbox rule" to ameliorate some of the problems
resulting from negotiations between parties separated by distance.
These negotiations were conducted through a medium that
necessarily involved some delay in transmission. Physical pieces of
mail had to be trucked and trekked from the sender to the addressee,
and in the meantime each party was uncertain about the state of their
negotiations. The mailbox (or "deposited acceptance") rule was
devised to make an acceptance binding when deposited in the mail,
thus concluding the bargain at an earlier point in time. 67 As newer
and quicker modes of communication came into general use-the
telegraph, for instance-they were assimilated into the existing
mailbox rule paradigm. 68 But by the end of the Twentieth Century it
was clear that most commercial correspondence of any urgency was
going to be communicated by some mode involving no significant
delay at all, other than the recipient's procrastination in attending to
it. The telephone and the telegraph were early advances over what
we now derisively refer to as "snail mail," but the telex, the fax, and
now e-mail and the Internet are arguably even more significant
innovations. Far more important today than any mailbox rule is the
prospect of important contracts being formed using these new modes
of communication that are not only instant, but involve no direct, real
time communication between human beings at all.69 Web sites
66. See Robert A. Hillman, Rolling Contracts,71 FORDHAM L. REV. 743 (2002).
67. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 63 cmt. a (1981).
68. Id. § 63 illus. 1.
69. E.g., Specht v. Netscape Comm. Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002). See generally
Valerie Watnick, The ElectronicFormation of Contractsand the Common Law "Mailbox Rule",
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present the prospective buyer of goods or services with the
opportunity to express assent to a contract merely by clicking
through a series of screens, making product choices, perhaps adding
them to a virtual shopping cart, and checking "I assent" or even just
"submit" whenever requested to do so. At the end of this process an
individual may be bound to a contract, the detailed terms of which
she has not read or even seen, and of which she probably does not
have a copy. 70

Whatever may be the weakness of the assent

expressed by one who physically signs her name to a standardized
form printed on paper, that act of signing seems to me to have a far
more cautionary aspect than the mere clicking of a box on a
computer screen. 7 1 Standardized forms on steroids, electronic
contracts seem nevertheless to be viewed so far by many courts that
just another acceptable and
have considered the question as 72
"efficient" mode of mass-contracting.
A few more developments should be noted here. Mass-market
sellers of services such as banks and credit-card issuers,
telecommunications providers, and the like, customarily include with
the monthly statements sent to their customers other pieces of paper
called "bill-stuffers." Sometimes these are statements required by
law or regulation to be so promulgated; sometimes they are simply
56 BAYLOR L. REV. 175 (2004).
70. E.g., Forrest v. Verizon Comm., Inc., 805 A.2d 1007 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (enforcing forum
selection clause in electronic contract on general contract principles); cf Comb v. PayPal, Inc.,
218 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (recognizing general validity of online agreements but
invalidating on ground of unconscionability).
71. Professor Randy Barnett has expressed a contrary view. Randy E. Barnett, Consenting
to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 627 (2002). After discussing the general proposition
that by signing an agreement one manifests in general her consent to be legally bound to its terms,
Barnett observes: "Clicking the button that says 'I agree' [to a 'click-through' agreement], no less
than signing one's name on the dotted line, indicates unambiguously: I agree to be legally bound
by the terms in this agreement." Id. at 635. But typically the signing of a written agreement,
even if accompanied by a series of "initialings" as well, is a one-time action, with substantial
"cautionary" as well as "channeling" aspects. (Recall the well-worn phrase: "Sign on the dotted
line.") Cf Lon L. Fuller, Considerationand Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 800-03 (1941). In
contrast, on-line transactions typically involve a whole series of clickings and typings to get from
start to finish; whether any particular one of those has the kind of symbolic significance equal to
the signing of one's name on a document seems to me to be extremely dubious.
72. E.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004) (defendant's
repetitive conduct bound it to plaintiff's terms and conditions of use). But see Specht v. Netscape
Comm. Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002) (arbitration clause in defendant's terms of use not
binding on plaintiff not shown to have notice of their existence). See generally Jennifer
Femminella, Online Terms and Conditions Agreements: Bound by the Web, 17 ST. JOHN'S J.
LEGAL COMMENT. 87 (2003); Christina L. Kunz et al., Browse-Wrap Agreements: Validity of
Implied Assent in Electronic Form Agreements, 59 BUS. LAW. 279 (2003).
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offers of other products or services. Their sheer number and often
lack of easy readability make it likely that many go straight from the
bill envelope to the "circular file." But occasionally these enclosures
purport to restate and modify the terms of whatever agreement the
customer might earlier have signed (literally or virtually). Such
communications typically permit the customer to avoid the alteration
in the terms of her relationship with the service provider only by
terminating the relationship within a certain period of time, and/or
perhaps before entering into another transaction (e.g., before using
the credit card to make a purchase or obtain an advance). Of course,
calling them "communications" at all concedes a disputable point,
since they may in fact have been designed not to be read, but to be
ignored. Some notable judicial decisions have declined to endorse
73
this tactic, but others seem to view this as yet another situation
where the consumer has at least an opportunity to read and react, and
therefore fails to do so at her peril.74
The final-at least for now-step in this process, the reductio ad
absurdum of contract, seems to be the blanket unilateralmodification clause. In this case, a standardized form-perhaps on
paper, perhaps merely clicked-through on a screen-includes a
clause that literally permits the drafting party to modify the contract
between it and the customer whenever and however it wants, simply
by notifying the customer to that effect. 75 This takes Llewellyn's
famous "blanket assent" one giant step farther. 76 Not only does the
adhering consumer give a blanket assent to any terms contained in
the seller's form, but by the terms of that form she also agrees, in
advance, to whatever other changes or new terms the seller may wish
to impose in the future. To call this a "contract" is to do
considerable violence to the notion of contract-as-assent as it existed
through most of the Twentieth Century. A somewhat similar
situation obtains where employers, that have earlier bound
themselves in some fashion to worker-protective rules, may claim the

73. E.g., Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003); Stone v. Golden Wexler & Sarnese
P.C., 341 F. Supp. 2d 189 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
74. See generally William J. Condon, Jr., ElectronicAssent to Online Contracts: Do Courts
ConsistentlyEnforce Clickwrap Agreements?, 16 REGENT U. L. REv. 433 (2004).
75. E.g., Hutcherson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 793 N.E.2d 886 (I11.App. Ct. 2003).
76.

(1960).

See KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 370
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right later to unilaterally change those rules by simply promulgating
new ones. This situation puts employees in the position of choosing
between acceptance of the new rules and giving up their jobs.77
B. Dominance of the DrafterII
Our discussion earlier described a number of ways in which the
creators of contract documents could use their control over the
formation process to include terms favorable to themselves. In the
preceding section, we noted that new modes of contracting have
magnified, to a considerable degree, the drafter's power to impose
terms. This would be a matter of some concern even if drafters today
were simply making the kinds of contracts that they have been
making and that society has been living with for years. This is not
the case, however. New modes of contracting are going hand in
hand with new types of contracts, with even more problematic
results.
In every transaction, a principal function of the drafting of a
contract is to cover matters that the law does not address at all by
defining the performance that the parties are agreeing to exchange.
Every transaction type has aspects peculiar to it, and where the
drafter is an enterprise that enters into dozens, perhaps hundreds or
thousands of similar transactions, standardized forms are not merely
useful, but are an indispensable means of providing the necessary
content. A second function of contract drafting is to modify or
displace specific default rules, either common law or statutory. Both
the common law and U.C.C. Article 2 contain many default rules
from which the parties are free to depart by mutual agreement. The
mere fact that an agreement departs from the default rules does not,
by itself, render that agreement improper or invalid. We have come
to call such rules "defaults" for just that reason; they state rules that
apply only if the parties have not agreed otherwise.78 Default rules
can represent more than just the law's attempt to provide off the rack
77. E.g., Asmus v. Pac. Bell, 999 P.2d 71 (Cal. 2000). This area of case law is surveyed in
W. David Slawson's Unilateral Contracts of Employment: Does Contract Law Conflict with
Public Policy?, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 9 (2003). See also Franklin G. Snyder, The
PerniciousEffect of Employment Relationships on the Law of Contracts, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L.
REV. 33 (2003).
78. The area of default rules has received much attention from contracts theorists in recent
years. E.g., Symposium on Default Rules and ContractualConsent, 3 SO. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1
(1993).
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terms that mirror those that the parties would otherwise most likely
have hand-tailored for themselves. Such rules may reflect policy
choices aimed at protecting one party from overreaching or
oppression by the other.7 9 To the extent that they serve this function,
any displacement of such default rules should be subject to the
scrutiny of contract law, both procedurally and substantively.
When it comes to displacing rules of law, however, turn-of-thecentury form contracts go well beyond their Modem Contract Law
predecessors. For a variety of reasons, the present-day mass contract
is likely to include terms that in one way or another represent a kind
of opting-out, not just from a particular legal rule, but from contract
law itself. The fact that Americans have a federal system with fiftyplus legal jurisdictions and a contract law regime that is similarly
federalized means that the rules governing contract enforcement vary
from state to state-not only the substantive rules, (including the
nature and extent of remedies for breach), but also the procedural
rules, including the availability and nature of jury trials and of class
actions. Furthermore, some states will have enacted legislation that
attempts to protect contracting parties, particularly consumers or
workers, from various kinds of perceived abuse. This multiplicity of
legal regimes creates the possibility that the legal rules of one
jurisdiction will be more favorable to the mass contract drafter than
the rules of another. For standard-form contracts to pay attention to
matters of procedure, as well as substance, is not a new development,
of course. The law has traditionally regulated some such terms, such
as confession-of-judgment (cognovit) clauses, 80 for instance, and
jury waivers. 81 Today's form contract is likely to go farther in
several respects including: Choice of law, choice of venue, and
agreement to arbitration.
Each of these three devices is a kind of opting-out, to different
79. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989) (proposing the notion of "penalty defaults").
80. Pursuant to its authority under the FTC Act, the Federal Trade Commission has made it
an Unfair Act for a bank to enter into a consumer credit agreement that contains a confession of
judgment, or "cognovit" clause. 12 C.F.R. § 227.13 (2006).
81. See generally Andrew M. Kepper, Contractual Waiver of Seventh Amendment Rights:
Using the PublicRights Doctrine to Justify a Higher Standardof Waiverfor Jury-Waiver Clauses
than for Arbitration Clauses, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1345 (2006); Wayne Klomp, Harmonizing the
Law in Waiver of Fundamental Rights: Jury Waiver Provisions in Contracts, 6 NEV. L.J. 545
(2005-2006); Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Clauses, Jury-Waiver Clauses, and Other Contractual
Waivers of ConstitutionalRights, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167 (2004).
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degrees. With a choice of law clause, the drafter attempts to insure
that no matter where any litigation involving the contract should take
place, the substantive rules applicable to resolution of the dispute
will be those of a particular jurisdiction, one whose laws, in at least
some respects, are presumably more favorable to the drafter than
other jurisdictions' are likely to be. 82 With a choice of venue clause,
the drafter attempts to assure itself of a favorable court system as
well.83 To some extent a choice of venue provision may be just a
means of buttoning down the choice of law, and the two clauses may
well go hand-in-hand. But the choice of venue clause also has a
practical aspect. It represents an attempt to make sure that any
litigation resulting from the transaction will necessarily take place
only at a location convenient for the drafter and quite possibly-and
84
perhaps not incidentally-inconvenientfor the other party.
An arbitration clause, the third of this trilogy of opting-out
devices, goes well beyond the first two. By choosing a method of
dispute-resolution that only tangentially involves the court system
and need not employ any particular set of legal rules, the drafter is
opting out of the legal system almost completely. Only "almost
completely," however, because both the contract law system and the
public court system may be involved, at least peripherally. The
proponent of arbitration must initially resort to the court system for
enforcement of the arbitration clause if the other party resists.
Judicial aid may also be required to enforce the arbitrators' award
82. Recent developments in this area exhibit a fascinating interplay between legal
institutions: The American Law Institute ("ALI") and the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL") on the one hand, and state legislatures on the other. The
recently revised Official Article 1 of the UCC contains a revised choice of law provision, § 1301(c), that would permit contracting parties (in non-consumer cases) to choose any jurisdiction's
law as applicable, while restricting choice of law in consumer contracts to jurisdictions that have
a "reasonable relation" to the transaction. U.C.C. § 1-301(e) (2003). State legislatures of nearly
half the states have approved the new Article 1, but so far every one of them has rejected this
particular change, hewing instead to the former § 1-105(1), which imposed the "reasonable
relation" restriction on choice of law clauses generally, without regard to whether they were in
"consumer contracts" or not. U.C.C. § 1-105(1) (1995) (amended 2003).
83. See generally William J. Woodward, Jr., Finding the Contract in Contractsfor Law,
Forum and Arbitration,2 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 1 (2005).
84. E.g., Bolter v. Superior Court, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 888, 895 (Ct. App. 2001) (holding
franchisor's contractual "prohibition against consolidation, limitation on damages and forum
selection provisions have no justification other than as a means of maximizing an advantage...
effectively preclud[ing] franchisees from ever raising any claims against it"). See generally
Susan Randall, JudicialAttitudes Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of Unconscionability,
52 BUFF. L. REV. 185, 214 (2004).
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once it has been rendered. Contract law potentially comes into play

at the first of those two points; the question whether to enforce an
arbitration clause necessarily entails deciding whether the parties
have entered into a valid agreement that arbitration should be
required in the event of a dispute between them. 85 Choice of law and
choice of venue clauses must also pass muster with at least one court,
and perhaps more than one, in the course of the resolution of the
parties' dispute. 86 Because of the way the law has developed in this
area, however, the mandatory arbitration clause has the potential of
avoiding judicial scrutiny entirely. 8 7 In situations where a challenge
to the validity of the arbitration agreement is deemed by the court to
be one which the arbitrators, rather than the court, must decide, the

dispute may disappear into the darkness of an arbitration proceeding,
never again to see the light of judicial day. Little wonder, indeed,
that the compulsory arbitration clause has become a darling of the

drafters.
IV. THE TASK FOR CONTRACT LAW

In this section of my discussion, I will argue the following three
related propositions:
1) A healthy legal system requires a suitable process by which
competing interests may be balanced. This is true of the interests
governed by contract law. In the case of individual contracts, the
85. The Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") provides that to be enforceable an arbitration
clause must be part of an enforceable contract. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). State statutes are to the same
effect. See generally Richard E. Speidel, Consumer Arbitration of Statutory Claims: Has PreDispute [Mandatory]Arbitration Outlived its Welcome?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1069 (1998). See also
Knapp, Taking Contracts Private, supra note 6, at 763 n.7, for a collection of articles on
mandatory arbitration.
86. See generally Woodward, Jr., supra note 83.
87. This is the legacy of the notorious case, Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin
Manufacturing Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967), in which the Supreme Court held that when fraudulent
inducement is asserted as the ground for avoiding the effect of an arbitration clause, that issue
must be left to the arbitrators for decision unless the asserted fraud was directed at the arbitration
clause itself rather than at the contract as a whole. The history and effect of Prima Paint is
critically examined in Richard C. Reuben's article, First Options, Consent to Arbitration, and the
Demise of Separability: Restoring Access to Justicefor Contracts with ArbitrationProvisions, 56
SMU L. REV. 819 (2003) (viewing some more recent decisions as perhaps heralding the demise
of Prima Paint's doctrine of"separability"). A more favorable view of that doctrine is expressed
in Alan Scott Rau's Everything You Really Need to Know About "Separability" in Seventeen
Simple Propositions,14 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 1 (2003). Professor Reuben's hope was apparently
unfounded. See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 126 S. Ct. 1204 (2006) (holding that
because the contract at issue contains an arbitration clause, arbitrators, not courts, must decide
whether the usurious nature of a contract renders it void under Florida law).
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legal system is not presently providing such a process.
2) The parties to these individual contracts are more in need of
an adequate legal process than are parties to other kinds of contracts.
They are also, if anything, more deserving of one.
3) In order to provide individual contracting parties with an
adequate process, the courts can and must play a more critical and
assertive role where individual contracts are concerned.
A. The Legal System for Individual Contracts is Inadequate.
Whatever its strengths and weaknesses may be in comparison
with other systems one might imagine, the Anglo-American legal
system by and large has always had as its core an adversarial model.
Each party-acting on its own behalf or through a zealous
advocate-vigorously presents a claim. In the case of the criminal
law system, the competing claims are presented to an impartial
tribunal which adjudicates the competing claims and decides whether
the guilt of the accused has been sufficiently proven. The tort system
is similar, although both the interests at stake and the possible
outcomes are substantially different. In both criminal and tort cases,
the adversaries present evidence and argue their respective cases, and
an independent public tribunal decides the outcome.
In the case of contract law, the picture is more complicated.
Since this area of law exists primarily to enforce commercial
agreements, and since it presumes generally that parties are able to
bargain vigorously in whatever market they are dealing, the initial
legal process is, in theory at least, one in which the legal outcome (a
negotiated contract, having the force of law) is the product of
vigorous and self-interested bargaining by the two adversaries. After
their bargain has been struck, and an agreement reached on its terms,
a period of mutually beneficial cooperative activity may follow, and
indeed may continue through to full performance. But before that
point is reached, a dispute may arise between them. Here again,
vigorous self-interested bargaining may produce a settlement, based
perhaps on the perceived application of rules of law, perhaps on
other considerations, or some mix of the two. If a settlement is
reached, no third-party adjudication is necessary. Only if the dispute
cannot be resolved by the parties themselves will it be referred to
some other body for adjudication. This may be a court of law, in
which case the court will find facts and apply rules of law as dictated
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by the legal regime in which it operates. This picture of American
contract law reveals an adversarial system in which two institutions,
although acting independently, together mediate the interests of the
parties: the market and the courts.
The above description of the contract law process may be
simplified and a bit idealized, but not to the point of inaccuracy, I
think, at least where two business enterprises are concerned. We can

call such a contract a "commercial contract." In the initial contractmaking process and in the later resolution of their dispute, each party
to a commercial contract will have available to it various kinds of
expertise, business as well as legal, and will be able to present its
own viewpoint vigorously and potentially persuasively. The more

successful the enterprise, the stronger its bargaining power may be,
but both parties come to the table knowing they are in an adversarial
process in which they are expected to, and potentially can, take care
of their own interests.
Now consider the parties to what I choose to refer to here as an
"individual contract."
By this I mean not a contract between

individuals, but a contract between a flesh-and-blood individual, on
the one hand, and a commercial enterprise on the other. We are used
to calling these "consumer contracts," and I employ a broader term
here so as to include contracts in which the individual is not a buyer
of goods or services, but rather a seller of her labor. We think of
these latter relationships as "employment contracts," but for our

purposes here the contract of an individual worker (as contrasted
with a collectively bargained labor contract) has enough in common
88
with the ordinary consumer contract to treat them together.

88. In a recent article, Professors Alan Schwartz and Robert E. Scott explored the use of
default rules and mandatory terms in commercial contracts, concluding that much present-day
contract law is unduly restrictive of parties' freedom to contract as they wish. See Alan Schwartz
& Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541 (2003).
They confined their observations, however, to what they called "Category 1 contracts," in which
firms contract with each other. Contracts between individuals (their "Category 2") they saw as
regulated primarily by family law. Contracts in which firms sell to individuals (their "Category
3") they characterized as regulated primarily by consumer protection law, real property law and
securities laws, while individual sales to firms (their "Category 4") they relegated to the sphere of
employment law. Id. at 544. Others have seen contracts as divided into three types: Type (I)person-to-person; Type (2)-person-to-organization; and Type (3)-organization-to-organization.
See, e.g., Ethan J. Leib, On Collaboration, Organizations, and Conciliation in the General
Theory of Contract, 24 QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 1, 2 (2005) (commenting on Daniel Markovits,
Contract and Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J. 1417 (2004)). My discussion here is directed
exclusively toward Schwartz & Scott's Categories 3 and 4, which together make up Leib's Type
(2); these are the contracts I have referred to above as "individual contracts." My suggestion is
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So how does the contract law system treat the individual
contract as compared to the commercial contract? Assume, as we
did earlier, that the vast number of consumer contracts are
standardized forms. Individual workers may not even have written
contracts, of course. If they do, however, those contracts will
probably be on standardized forms as well. Each form contract will
have inserted in it some terms particular to that deal, including what
is being purchased, the price to be paid, and perhaps a few other
specifics such as time and mode of delivery. Those terms will be
more or less transparent-they will be discussed, and, in broad terms
at least, understood by both parties. The drafter or its agents will at
some point have either created or at least read and understood both
the principal terms and the boilerplate (the "fine print") of the form.
As a general matter, will the individuals who enter into those
contracts have available to them the time or the expertise to study
and evaluate the boilerplate terms in the contracts they are offered?
Will they even read them? If they were to do so, would they
understand fully the effects, both legal and practical, that the terms
are intended to have? If not, would they retain an attorney to do this
job for them? And suppose they did: would they be able to negotiate
for, and get, better terms than those offered? Or could they
effectively comparison-shop for better terms from competing
providers of goods and services? If you answered yes to all or even
one of the foregoing questions, then what follows below may be less
than persuasive to you-but if you did, you are also not living in the
same world as I am. If you are still on board, however, then perhaps
you will agree that most of the terms of the ordinary individual
contract do not represent the product of a vigorous adversarial
bargaining process. 89 This does not necessarily mean that those
terms are unfairly balanced in favor of the drafter. If they are not,
however, this is because the drafter has voluntarily restrained itself,
not because the bargaining power of the individual has produced that
result.
If consumers were organized, so that consumer contracts could
be collectively bargained, then the combination of market and legal
that instead of regarding such contracts as specialized and of little interest, the general law of
contract should if anything regard them as being in need of more attention rather than less.
89. See the excellent discussion of standardized-form contracting in Rakoff, supra note 24,
at 1220-29.
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institutions could protect the interests of individual consumers, the
same way that collectively bargained union contracts protect the
interests of individual workers.
Ordinary individuals and nonunionized workers, however, take whatever contracts they are
offered because they know that realistically they have no choice. In
addition, corporate agents they deal with, if questioned about a
particular term, may well say truthfully, "Oh, that's not something
we can change. That's something the lawyers make us put in."
At the second stage, if and when a contractual dispute arises, can
the individual adequately protect her interests? To do so, she must
be able to obtain legal advice, and to have access either to a court of
law or to an alternate legal process that will offer a sufficiently
accessible and neutral adjudicating body. Although a criminal
defendant will usually be entitled to legal representation in one form
or another if she cannot afford to provide it for herself,90 the same is
not true for parties to civil litigation. The individual plaintiffs
ability to obtain legal counsel will depend on her own resources
and/or the apparent value of her claim. The ordinary business
corporation necessarily has and uses legal counsel at least at the
commencement of its activities, and probably from time to time
thereafter, so it either has counsel already or knows how and where
to obtain it, if and when the need arises. The ordinary consumer or
worker neither retains nor has easy access to legal counsel, however,
at either the bargaining or the dispute stage. So in an adversarial
system, she is at a distinct disadvantage from the outset and remains
so throughout. This is not to say that every individual labors under
these disadvantages, of course-rich folks who have lawyers also
buy things for personal use. (And more and better things, too.)
Conversely, not every business enterprise habitually uses or has
readily available to it legal counsel. The smaller the enterpriseespecially if not in corporate form-the less likely that will be. But
we know from our experience in the real world, do we not, that the
above generalizations are essentially accurate? Most consumers and
90. E.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-40 (1963) (right to counsel in state
felony proceeding); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 27 (1972) (criminal trial in which
imprisonment is potential penalty); Ala. v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 658 (2002) (suspended
sentence invalid unless defendant given counsel). See generally Norman Lefstein, In Search of
Gideon's Promise: Lessonsfrom England and the Need for FederalHelp, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 835
(2004). The Gideon case is the subject of the classic book Gideon's Trumpet. ANTHONY LEWIS,
GIDEON'S TRUMPET (Random House 1964).
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workers do not have legal counsel in the agreement-making process,
and most will have difficulty obtaining it if a dispute does later arise.
On the other hand, most business corporations have previously
employed lawyers, use forms drafted by lawyers, and are prepared to
resort to legal process if necessary to resolve a dispute.
The ability to obtain effective counsel-already chancy at best,
for most individuals-may be further impaired by the contractual
devices we have discussed above. Limitations and exclusions of
warranties, limitations on seller liability, shortened time periods for
notice, and the like, are all likely to reduce the value of a plaintiffs
claim below what it would be under the default legal rules, and thus
also to reduce the likelihood of effective representation. Choice of
law provisions may also reduce the value of a claim, and choice of
venue provisions may directly increase the cost, financial and
otherwise, of bringing one. And an effective arbitration clause,
broadly drafted, may have the effect not only of depriving the
individual of her right to a jury trial, but also of eliminating the
possibility of a class action-the kind of action which for many
consumer claims may be the only viable one. 9 1 Indeed, an effective
arbitration clause in an individual contract may have the result of
completely deterring any successful legal action by the individual:
legal counsel is unavailable and a court of law is inaccessible. It
would, I think, be naive in the extreme not to assume that for the
drafter of the form contract, this is the ultimate measure of success. 92
"Opting out" in this sense thus becomes not only an intransitive verb,
but a transitive one as well, as in "I had a potentially valid claim, but
I was opted out."
The previous argument depends in part on the proposition that
the agreement-making process should be regarded as an integral part
This seems to go against the
of the contract law system.
conventional common law wisdom that there is little, if any,
91. See generally Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to Eliminate
Consumer Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 75 (2004). Recent federal legislation will sharply restrict consumer class
actions. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1453, 1711-1715 (West 1994 &
Supp. 2006). Regardless of whether one considers this latest development a true "reform" or
merely further evidence that business interests presently hold sway over Congress, it nevertheless
does represent the appropriate way to implement such changes in procedural law, as opposed to
the imposition of opt-out provisions in adhesive individual contracts.
92. See Bolter v. Superior Court, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 888, 896 (Ct. App. 2001) (franchisor
continually modified agreement to constrict the rights of franchisees).
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constraint on the bargaining process-no duty (unless specifically
assumed) to bargain in good faith, or otherwise to do anything but
pursue one's own unbridled self-interest at the bargaining table. 9 3 In
this view the legal system plays a role only later, if and when
enforcement is sought. But the making of a contract is not a purely
personal act, with which only the immediate parties are concerned.
By this I do not mean merely that many important contracts have
impacts on those who are not a party to them-externalities, if you
will. They do, of course, but my point here is a different one. My
agreement to have lunch with my friend tomorrow may meet every
requirement of a contract (offer, acceptance, consideration, lawful
objective, competent parties, etc.), but commentators have concluded
that because it is so purely personal, it is still not a contract-not an
agreement that the law will enforce. 94 Fine; no problem. But the
individual contracts we have been speaking of in this discussion are
not personal, in that sense; they have, and are intended to have, the
potential of legal enforceability. 9 5 "Agreement" making may be a
purely private affair; who I agree to lunch with is nobody's business
but mine and his. But "contract" making is a public function,
because it creates publicly enforceable rights. To say that an
arbitration clause must be enforced because it is part of a valid
contract is to beg the question of why that contract-or any other-is
enforceable at all. Enforceability of any agreement is a function not
just of private assent, but of the body of public law-the law of
"contract"-that enables contracting parties to invoke the power of
the state. If a business enterprise really wants to opt out of the legal
system, then let it rely entirely on extra-legal (but not illegal) means
93. See generally Charles L. Knapp, Enforcing the Contract to Bargain, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv.
673 (1969); E. Allan Farnsworth, PrecontractualLiability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair
Dealing and FailedNegotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 217 (1987).
94. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.7 at 119 (4th ed. 2004) (citing Mitzel v.
Hauck, 105 N.W.2d 378 (S.D. 1960) (holding agreement to go on hunting trip not contract for
purpose of applying automobile guest statute)).
95. Conventional contract theory says that a subjective intent to be legally bound is not
necessary to the formation of a binding contract. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 21
("Neither real nor apparent intention that a promise be binding is essential to the formation of a
contract .... "). Agreements between individuals may sometimes not be the product of an
intention to be legally bound, and sometimes agreements between firms are also intended to be
extra-legal. See Macaulay, supra note 1; see also Scott, supra note 3; Bernstein, supra note 14.
But contracts between firms and individuals-the "individual contracts" that are the subject of
this discussion-are probably always intended by their drafters to have legal effect, and are so
understood by their adherents.
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of enforcement, and hope that its contracting partners will feel the
same way. But an entity that seeks the aid of the law to enforce any
agreement-even an "opting out" one-is necessarily subjecting
itself to a public process, where public interests may be at stake.
B Individuals Who Enter into Contracts
Need and Deserve the Law's Protection
One might grant every point which the preceding section tries to
make, and yet be unconvinced. Why should it matter, you may well
ask, if individuals are at a disadvantage when it comes to making and
enforcing contracts, if the result is nevertheless a mass-contracting
system that gets goods and services to consumers and moves the
labor supply around efficiently? These are difficult and important
questions, and they deserve a more comprehensive response than I
can provide here. My partial, personal response is basically a
normative one. These individuals, not the business corporations
from whom they buy their goods and services, and to whom they sell
their labor-these individuals are the polity. They are the citizens;
they are the voters; they are the ones created equal, with certain
inalienable rights. Should our legal system say to those individuals,
"You folks have no legal rights other than those which business
corporations choose to give you, and no recourse to the courts if
those corporations choose to deny it?" This seems to me to be
fundamentally antithetic to a democratic society. 96 To have no
ability to bargain effectively over the transactions you enter into, and
then to be bound not only to whatever terms the other party may
insist on at the outset, but also to whatever terms it may later choose
to impose, is simply a denial of your basic humanity-of your
citizenhood, if you will. At the start of this discussion, I posited the
imminent arrival of a new Medieval era, where the institution of
contract becomes not a liberating force, but an enslaving one.
Freedom of contract, freedom to contract, even freedom from
contract, each in its way is a kind of freedom. But the freedom to
make only contracts which take away your rights is a poor kind of

96. See generally Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: The Problem of
Arbitration, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 279 (2004); see also W. David Slawson, Standard
Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REv. 529 (1971).
But cf Sternlight & Jensen supra note 91.
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freedom indeed.
A related but distinct point, I think, is that justice for individuals
simply matters more to them and to the state. Business enterprises
are founded for the purpose of making a profit. Some enterprises
will prosper and others will languish; indeed, some will become
mighty and others will disappear completely. This is not only
tolerated by a capitalist economy, it is expected. The stronger and
better managed enterprises will survive, and the weaker will fail.
Not that the failure of an enterprise does not present a lot of
problems for all concerned, but a system of private enterprise
assumes that possibility as part of a necessary, and ultimately
socially beneficial, process. The demise of a corporation is perhaps a
sad occasion, but it is not an actual death. The death of an individual
is. Individuals must consume to live, and must work to survive.
Must we say that individuals who have effectively no choice but to
enter into a marketplace where they have little or no legal power are
nevertheless to be treated by the law with less solicitude than the
powerful corporations with whom those individuals must deal? To
do so is to deny the humanity of the former, and falsely reify the
latter.
C. Courts Must Play a More
Active Role in AdjudicatingIndividual Contracts
Maybe Twenty-First Century contract law is not in fact actually
dead, but it does seem to be, at best, in failing health. Our discussion
has arrived at the point of actually attempting to prescribe some
medicine for what ails it. There are a variety of different measures
that one might consider. Some are legislative, some extra-legal;
some may be practical and others probably utopian. 98 But in the
short run, the development most likely to stem the tide of drafter
dominance would be a recognition on the part of the courts that the
individual contract simply does not fit the conventional bargained-for
assent model of traditional contract law, and should not be judged by
it. Years ago, Professor Arthur Leff famously pointed out that
97. See Todd D. Rakoff's Is "Freedom from Contract" Necessarily a Libertarian
Freedom?, 2004 WIs. L. REV. 477, for a thoughtful and provocative discussion exploring "the
possibility that extending the regime of contract may sometimes reduce freedom." Id. at 493.
98. Cf Knapp, Taking Contracts Private, supra note 6, at 790-97 (discussing various
approaches to mandatory arbitration).
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litigation was an extremely inefficient mode of consumer protection,
as compared to legislative and/or administrative regulation of various
types. 99 True then and true now, but the problems with the
alternatives are today, if anything, greater than they were when Leff
wrote. For the time being, pending a change of heart or personnel in
our other legal institutions, the courts are the front line here. So how
should the courts approach evaluating and enforcing the individual
contract?
Long ago, in a legal galaxy far away, Karl Llewellyn considered
the problem of the standardized contract. His solution was to regard
the adherent to a standard form as giving express assent to the
"dickered" terms, plus a "blanket assent" to whatever else the form
might contain, subject to the qualification that no assent was to be
presumed for "unreasonable or indecent terms. '' l° This is not in any
sense a true "assent" to each and every term in the form. At most, as
Randy Barnett has put it, it amounts to a generalized "consent to be
legally bound."''
This insight may have widespread acceptance
among commentators, but the courts have yet to fully appreciate the
distinction.
For years, judges have issued condescending
admonitions that parties who fail to read contracts before signing
them are necessarily negligent or unreasonable, and not deserving of
the law's protection. 10 2 Adoption of such an imperial perspective is
not only undeserved, but almost surely hypocritical. If ever there
was a "duty to read," there surely cannot be one today, at least not
where standardized individual contracts are concerned. A few years
ago, discussing today's mass-contracting practices, I wrote the
following: "Imposing a general duty to read is one thing; imposing
such a duty in circumstances where we know it cannot or will not be
performed is Catch-22 with a vengeance.'' 0 3 Where a standardized
individual contract is at issue, strict scrutiny of that contract by the
courts is not only appropriate, but necessary. Assuming that insight
were to be generally accepted, what are its implications for contract
law? What should "strict scrutiny" mean, where contracts are
99. Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionabilityand the Crowd-Consumersand the Common Law
Tradition,31 U. PITT. L. REv. 349 (1970).
100.
101.
102.
103.

LLEWELLYN, supra note 76.
Barnett, supra note 71, at 634-35.
E.g., Parrish v. Jackson W. Jones, 629 S.E.2d 468 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).
Knapp, Taking ContractsPrivate, supra note 6, at 770.
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concerned?
To begin with, every standardized individual contract should be
04
regarded, presumptively at least, as procedurally unconscionable.'
This terminology can be off-putting, because it seems to assume that
the way in which the contract was formed is to be regarded as
somehow shockingly unfair. Not at all. A declaration of procedural
unconscionability is merely contract law's way of sorting-of
identifying contracts that were formed in a fashion that permits their
drafters virtually unchecked latitude, making it appropriate for their
contents to be subject to judicial review if and when legal
enforceability is at issue. Standardized individual contracts by their
very nature fall into that category, and should therefore be so treated.
Since this presumption is based on generalities about contracting
practices, it should of course be a rebuttable one, but here again a
kind of strict scrutiny is appropriate. First of all, the burden should
be on the drafter to rebut it, not the other way around. To require an
individual consumer to show, as a predicate for judicial examination
of the terms of her contract, that she shopped around for better terms
elsewhere and could not find them is absurd. It is precisely because
individuals generally do not and cannot engage in this kind of selfprotective
activity
that
a
presumption
of procedural
0
5
unconscionability is justified in the first place.'
What could rebut
it? A showing that the term in question was understandingly and
willingly assented to. Otherwise, the mere fact that an individual
might have had alternatives had she the time, the resources, and the
knowledge to shop for them is simply irrelevant.
A related issue of assent arises with rolling contracts, and with
forms that purport to give their drafters more or less unlimited power
to revise the contract in the future, with or without some effective
104. The notions of "procedural" and "substantive" unconscionability were originated by
Professor Leff in his seminal article, and have become standard in the case law and the literature.
Leff, supra note 36, at 489-528.
105. In a paper written for a seminar course at Hastings, one of my students observed:
Proving procedural unconscionability in the form of oppression presents a vexing
problem for consumers seeking to claim some aspect of their purchase agreement is
unconscionable ....
Such proof often requires the buyer to possess extensive legal
knowledge prior to initiating the transaction and almost always requires the buyer to
engage in unrealistically diligent bargaining efforts.
Thorn Neale, Unconscionability Doctrine Revisited: Leff's "Functional Pathology" with a
Perverse New Twist 23 (March 5, 2006) (unpublished paper, U.C. Hastings College of Law) (on
file with author).
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opportunity on the part of the adherent then to resist or withdraw. I
have argued above that any terms that the individual is unable or
unlikely to access before being bound must necessarily fall into the
procedurally unconscionable category. What about those that come
after? Assuming that the adhering party knows, or should know (no,
I mean really should know), that additional or changing terms will be
forthcoming later, it is certainly possible to argue persuasively, as
Randy Bamett has done, that the adherent's "consent to be legally
bound" can apply to the later terms as well as those on the table at
the outset. 106 But even if we concede as a general matter that there
can be implied a consent to be legally bound by later terms, those
later terms should surely have no greater legitimacy in terms of
"actual assent" than the original ones did. If anything, they should
have less. Bill-stuffers are not going to be read at all; 10 7 booklets in
the box are going to be read only to the extent that they contain
operating instructions. 10 8 Yes, one might sit down and study the
terms of the insurance policy that came in the mail, 10 9 and yes, one
might read through the boilerplate of a cruise ticket to see if there is
anything scary there. 110 But one does not, unless and until some
circumstance makes it seem necessary to do so. Otherwise, life is
too short. I know it, you know it, and whether they will admit it or
not, judges know it too. No presumed consent to be bound by rolling
or later-added terms should preclude the court from treating any such
rolling contract as procedurally unconscionable, and therefore
subject to substantive judicial review.
Before going on to address the topic of substantive
unconscionability, we should spend a little more ink on the notion of
understanding and willing assent. It is not uncommon for an
employee to be asked by her employer to agree to a contract, on the
pain of otherwise being fired from her job. Maybe this is a noncompete agreement;.. maybe it provides for arbitration of any

106. Barnett, supra note 71, at 642-43.
107. E.g., Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003).
108. E.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
109. E.g., C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975).
110. E.g., Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, Inc. 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
111. See generally M. Scott McDonald, Noncompete Contracts: Understanding the Cost of
Unpredictability, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REv. 137 (2003) (exploring the current state of the law
on non-compete contracts).
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dispute arising out of her work relationship." 2 Whether it involves a
standard form or a hand-tailored agreement, in either case this need
not be a situation where the employee is ignorant of the content and
meaning of the terms to which her agreement is sought; quite the
contrary. Assuming such knowledge on her part, should a worker's
agreement made under the threat of being fired be necessarily
enforceable? The common law of contract permits avoidance of a
contract made under duress; this usually entails the making of an
improper threat which leaves the other party no reasonable
alternative. 113 The employer's argument here is that a threat to fire
an at-will employee cannot be an improper one, because at-will
employees can generally be discharged for, as it is traditionally put,
"a good reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all," and that in any
event the employee always has a reasonable alternative-she can
quit. But this argument goes too far. First, it is not generally true that
the discharge of an at-will employee can never be wrongful; the law
in most jurisdictions permits some exceptions. 1 4 And apart from
that, even though a statement of intention simply to discharge
someone who has no general legal protection against discharge may
not ordinarily be a "wrongful" act, the threat to fire an employee
whom you would not otherwise fire, solely to get her to enter into a
substantively unconscionable agreement, ought to be regarded as a
wrongful one.' 15 Of course that leaves open the question of whether
the agreement really is substantively unconscionable, but the court
cannot even address that issue unless it gets past the roadblock of
what we may, I think, fairly regard as an extorted "assent." Does the
worker have a reasonable alternative? It is, again, condescending in
the extreme to proclaim that a worker who depends on her job to
feed her family and provide health insurance for them necessarily has

112. See generally Michael Z. Green, Opposing Excessive Use of Employer Bargaining
Power in Mandatory Arbitration Agreements through Collective Employee Actions, 10 TEX.
WESLEYAN L. REv. 77, 79 (2003) (stating that the average employee "has little power to refuse
when the arbitration agreement is offered as a condition of employment").
113. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175(1) (1981).
114. E.g., Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977) (discharge in
order to deprive employee of earned commission); Schuster v. Derocili, 775 A.2d 1029 (Del.
2001) (discharge for resistance to sexual harassment). See generally KNAPP, KCP, supra note 32,
at 472-77.
115. E.g., D'Sa v. Playhut, Inc., 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 495 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (employee fired
for refusing to sign agreement containing illegal covenant not to compete).
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a "reasonable" alternative to her present employment.11 6 It may be
argued in opposition that such an approach would make it impossible
for employers to enter into binding contracts with their employees,
but of course that is not the case; it would simply inhibit the making
of substantively unconscionable ones.

Another situation in which the individual might arguably have
knowledge of the terms of the contract she later seeks to avoid is
17
where she claims fraud in the inducement by the drafter's agent.'
One may well understand, in general, the terms of the bargain to
which she is agreeing, and yet be induced to enter into that bargain
Form contracts
by fraudulent or material misrepresentations.
at staving off
aimed
provisions
of
a
combination
commonly contain
such claims: a strong merger clause; a clause stating that no
representations or warranties have been made other than those
expressed in the form; a clause disclaiming any reliance by the
adherent on any other representations; or a statement that no agent of
the drafting party is authorized to make any representations other
than those in the writing. These terms are designed to enable the
drafter to invoke the parol evidence rule, so as to prevent any
showing that oral representations or promises were made at all; to
preclude the adherent from claiming that she relied on any oral
representations, to the extent that any were actually made; and to
allow the drafter to disclaim responsibility for any representations
that were made and actually relied on, on the theory that in any event
they were outside the scope of the selling agent's authority. Such
drafting devices are often successful, and, as between commercial
parties, that may often be the right result.'18 But each one of those
arguments is persuasive only if one assumes that the individual read,
116. See generally Richard A. Bales, Contract Formation Issues in Employment Arbitration,
44 BRANDEIS L.J. 415 (2006); Sara Lingafelter, Lack of Meaningful Choice Defined: Your Job vs.
Your Right to Sue in a Judicial Forum, 28 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 803 (2005).
117. See the comments to section 163 of the Second Restatement of Contracts, which
describe "fraud in the factum" as fraud which prevents formation of any contract at all (such as
deceiving the other party into believing she is signing something other than a contract), as
opposed to "fraud in the inducement," misrepresentations made to persuade the other party that
the contract is a desirable one. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 163 cmt. a. This is
the same distinction made by UCC Sections 3-305(a)(1) and (2) in defining the enforcement
rights of the holder in due course of a negotiable instrument. See U.C.C. § 3-305 cmt. 1, para. 5.
118. See, e.g., Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris, 157 N.E.2d 597 (N.Y. 1959) (holding that a
disclaimer of representations clause in a commercial real estate contract precluded the buyer's
claim of fraudulent inducement, despite the traditional rule that the parol evidence rule does not
prevent proof of fraud).
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and understood, and assented to, those particularterms. In the case
of an individual contract, we cannot and should not assume that to be
the case. If the adherent makes a prima facie case of fraud in the
inducement, on the usual standard of clear and convincing evidence,
the burden should then be on the drafter to rebut that case, either by
meeting her factual showing of fraud with credible evidence to the
contrary, or by showing not merely that she signed the form, but that
she did in fact understand and agree that the agent's representation
would not bind his principal. 1 9 If this puts more of a burden on the
drafter than the traditional rule, then so be it. This is a burden that
the drafter should bear, as part of its cost of doing business. Under
this approach, enterprises would have an appropriate incentive to
better train and supervise their agents, or else to effectively
communicate to adhering parties the non-reliability of their agents'
representations.
Constraints of both time and space preclude our discussing in
detail here the numerous contractual clauses that might be tested
against the standard of substantive unconscionability. That's a topic
for another article-as of course it already has been, countless
times. 120 I want merely to suggest here that in many cases the courts'
approach to this question has also been flawed where individual
contracts are concerned. In the early heyday of unconscionability
jurisprudence, many courts reacted vigorously against commercial
practices that they regarded as unduly exploitive, particularly of low119. I have suggested above that terms providing for choice of law, choice of forum, and
mandatory arbitration are qualitatively different from garden-variety terms because in various
ways they limit adhering parties' access to the legal system that would otherwise resolve their
disputes. In somewhat similar fashion, it seems to me that terms like the merger clause, the nooral-modifications clause and the no-oral-representations clause are also qualitatively different
from terms that merely define the performance (how many, what quality, when delivered, etc.) or
the available remedy (damage limitations, etc.). These devices are intended to limit the court's
ability to find and enforce the agreement-in-fact between the parties. Hence my suggestion that
where the adhering party has made a sufficient prima facie case for fraud in the inducement, a
mere general "consent to be bound" by the written agreement should not be seen as a
relinquishment of the right to make that case.
120. In addition to Professor Leff's article, supra note 36, some notable examples include
Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & ECON. 293 (1975);
Robert A. Hillman, Debunking Some Myths About Unconscionability: A New Frameworkfor
U.C.C. Section 2-302, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1981); Harry G. Prince, Unconscionability in
California: A Need for Restraint and Consistency, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 459 (1995); and Carol B.
Swanson, Unconscionable Quandary: UCC Article 2 and the UnconscionabilityDoctrine, 31
N.M. L. REv. 359 (2001) (discussing the effect of the recent revision of Article 2 on the
unconscionability rule).
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income consumers. To some extent the legislatures and the agencies
took up that task, and judicial activity along this line abated. With the
ascent of Reaganomics' dynamic duo of privatization and
deregulation, interest in consumer protection reached a low point
across the board. 12 1 The recent renascence of unconscionability as a
doctrine that can actually decide cases is traceable mostly to
historical accident. As the Supreme Court and lower federal courts
have developed the jurisprudence of the Federal Arbitration Act,
there is almost no way that a trial court-federal or state--can play
any role in adjudicating the effect of an adhesion contract with an
arbitration clause, other than by invoking the notion of
unconscionability.1 22 The Supreme Court's sustained effort to
overcome any lingering vestige of anti-arbitration sentiment on the
courts' part, however, has produced a situation where it is simply
legally impossible to argue that an arbitration clause is
unconscionable merely because it shunts the parties' disputes into
arbitration; there must be a showing that the arbitration process
called for by the particular agreement would be substantively
unconscionable in one or more respects. The result has been a
ballooning of present-day cases in which the notion of
unconscionability is not only argued, but argued successfully
("Unconscionability II").123
In this new line of decisions, the
standardized contract is characterized as a contract of adhesion, and
for that reason as being procedurally unconscionable. The court then
examines the arbitration clause in detail, and explains what aspects
of its operation would be substantively so unfair to the adherent as to
be deemed legally unconscionable.' 24 The Supreme Court may yet
clamp down on this safety valve, requiring even the issue of
121. The various stages in the development and application of unconscionability
jurisprudence are admirably set forth by Professor Jeffrey W. Stempel in his article, Arbitration,
Unconscionability, and Equilibrium: The Return of Unconscionability Analysis as a
Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 757, 812-40. (2004).
122. See id. at 792-812.
123. See id. at 803-12; see also cases cited in Knapp, Taking ContractsPrivate,supra note 6,
at 796 nn. 118-19.
124. E.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Serv., Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000); see
also Dunham v. Envt'l Chem. Corp. No. C06-03389JSW, 2006 WL 2374703 (N.D. Cal. Aug 16,
2006); Higgins v. Superior Court, 140 Cal. App. 4th 1238 (Ct. App. 2006). For a critical analysis
of the California courts' approach to unconscionability analysis in arbitration cases, see Michael
G. McGuinness and Adam J. Karr's California's "Unique" Approach to Arbitration: Why This
Road Less Traveled Will Make All the Difference on the Issue of Preemption under the Federal
ArbitrationAct, 2005 J. DISP. RESOL. 61.
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1 25
unconscionability to be resolved by arbitrators and not by judges,
but for the time being many courts clearly regard this issue as still
within their purview. One long-term result of these new decisions
may well be an increased tendency to regard standardized, adhesive
forms in general as procedurally unconscionable, and therefore
subject to the kind of strict scrutiny suggested above. That of course
would have implications across the board for all manner of
individual contracts.' 26 The immediate result of Unconscionability II
is that we now have a fresh spate of decisions addressing claims of
substantive unconscionability. In one sense, these decisions are
peculiar to the ongoing and unresolved battle over mandatory
arbitration, but in a larger sense, they may represent a growing
willingness on the courts' part to examine carefully the effect of a
challenged contractual provision on the adheringparty.
Here, it seems to me, is the heart of the matter. Since freemarket economics became the reigning philosophy of not only
economists but many legislators and judges as well, it has seemed
that virtually any contract term one can imagine-"indentured
servitude" may be an exception--can be viewed as "efficient," and
therefore beyond challenge, merely because it may reduce operating
costs, make business more flexible, and generally be good for profits.
But this is hardly strict scrutiny; at most it's a kind of rational basis
test--could the drafter have had a legitimate business reason for
imposing this term? To ask the question is to answer it; the desire to
reduce costs and maximize profit is always a rational basis for a
corporate action. This approach is buttressed by the argument that
otherwise businesses will just pass their expenses on to consumers,
and then we will all be worse off.127 Whether increases in the

125. The Supreme Court is still apparently bent on pursuing its expansive pro-arbitration
course. See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 126 S, Ct. 1204 (2006).
126. See Stempel, supra note 121, at 808-12.
127. In Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991), Mr. Justice Blackmun,
writing for the court, declared that the defendant's choice of forum clause requiring trial in
Florida should be upheld and applied against the plaintiffs, Washington state residents, and added
the following observation: "it stands to reason that passengers who purchase tickets containing a
forum clause like that at issue in this case benefit in the form of reduced fares reflecting the
savings that the cruise line enjoys by limiting the fora in which it may be sued." Id. at 594
(emphasis added). In contrast, in Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126(9th Cir. 2003), the court declined
to accept the defendant's invitation to rule that long-distance carriers automatically pass on to
their customers any cost savings realized from substituting arbitration for litigation; noting that
the case came up with specific findings of fact that the arbitration provision at issue did not in fact
affect AT&T's costs, the court declared that it need not reach that issue. Id. at 1147.
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corporate cost of doing business will invariably be passed on to
consumers may be doubted; it seems at least barely possible that in
some cases market constraints will be such that the result could
instead be lower profits, or even lower executive salaries. (Okay, we
are fantasizing a little there.) In any event, what is missing in that
approach is a consideration of the impact of the contract or the
particular clause on the other party, the consumer or worker.
Individuals who enter into standardized contracts should at least be
entitled, when the enforceability of those contracts is called into
question, to have their interests balanced against those of the drafters,
instead of being ignored on the tacit assumption that whatever helps
business helps everybody. Calvin Coolidge once famously said, in a
dictum which for many years a lot of us thought was amusingly
dated, "The business of America is business."1' 28 Well, that wasn't
true in the Twenties, and it's not true today. The business of
business is business, to be sure. And maybe the business of business
lawyers is business, too. But the business of America's legal system
is protecting the life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness of its people.
V. CONCLUSION

The problem of mass-produced contracts of adhesion was a
Twentieth Century problem for contract law, which Twentieth
Century contract law never really solved. This was, of course, partly
because not everyone considered it a problem. But even those who
did were not able to come up with a principled approach that worked,
in the sense that courts would adopt and put it to general use. My
suggestion in this article represents my own good faith effort to steer
a course between the anything-goes, rational-basis Scylla of
automatic enforceability, and the somewhat scary Charybdis of
presumed invalidity. Leaving for another day the question of how to
deal with contracts between business enterprises having great
inequality of bargaining power, 129 I have stressed the particular
128. That is indeed what President Coolidge is famous for saying, as a quick Googling will
demonstrate. What he actually said was: "[T]he chief business of the American people is
business."

CLAUDE M. FUESS, CALVIN COOLIDGE-THE MAN FROM VERMONT 358 (1940).

Fuess goes on to quote the longer passage from which this excerpt is taken, which does read a bit
better than the simplified sound-bite version, but Coolidge was clearly a trickle-down economics
enthusiast-to the extent that he was enthusiastic about anything. See generally DONALD R.
MCCOY, CALVIN COOLIDGE-THE QUIET PRESIDENT 314-21 (1967).

129. See generally Garvin, supra note 13; Morant, supra note 13 (exploring that question at
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vulnerability of individuals in a corporation-dominated marketplace,
where the individual's ability to understand and bargain over any but
the most basic terms is simply lacking, albeit for a host of perfectly
understandable reasons. 130 And I have here joined my voice with
others who have over the years lamented the misuse of contract law
that follows when the power of the State is employed to reinforce the
power of those private interests who already wield great economic
power, and are prepared to use it against those
who have virtually no
13 1
economic or legal power, public or private.
When I began teaching contracts, some forty-odd years ago,
fresh from a good law school and a few years at a top-drawer law
firm, it simply did not occur to me that there were significant public
policy issues involved in that task. The duty of a contracts professor
seemed to me to be merely that of training effective attorneys, and
possibly skillful and sensible judges. This limited field of vision
may be traceable to aspects of my own background and training, but
I think it also reflects those earlier times, times when "public" law
seemed on course to move steadily and predictably toward a vision
of political and economic justice for all, while "private" law just did
its own thing. That was Then, though, and this is Now. TwentyFirst Century contracts teachers understand, I hope, that whatever
legal bells are tolling must necessarily be tolling for them as wellthat they are part of the ongoing dialogue in which all law teachers,
all lawyers, and all judges are engaged. Like so many Clark Kents,
mild-mannered and bespectacled, we nevertheless are called upon to
use whatever powers we possess in the search for Truth and Justice.
Because indeed that also is-or should be-The American Way.

length).
130. See Rakoff, supra note 24; see also Barnett, supra note 71 (suggesting that hostility
towards form contracts stems partly from an implicit adoption of a promise-based conception of
contractual obligation).
131. See Reuben, supra note 96 (recognizing that the relationship between democracy and
mandatory arbitration is a problematic one); see also Slawson, supra note 96 (advocating an
"administrative law" of contracts to keep form contracts consistent and fair to both parties).

